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Liberalization of agricultural markets leads to new risks for European farmers. This paper studies
the feasibility of income insurance schemes for European crop and livestock farmers. Different
insurance topics, such as governmental reinsurance and the use of mutual insurance funds, are
described and analyzed, using individual farm level data of different areas and commodities. In
this paper it is argued that ‘income’ insurance in European agriculture should be restricted to
yield-only insurance schemes that are organized per commodity and per region and in which
governments play the role of ‘lender of last resort’.
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Introduction
Income from farming is usually considered as rather volatile due to a whole series of stochastic
factors that affect production and prices. Throughout the years, various risk management tools have
been used to reduce, or to assist farmers to absorb, some of these risks. Also the Common
Agricultural Policy of the European Union (EU) has taken away some of the risks, for example by
assuring the prices of many agricultural products. However, price and production risks are likely to
increase in the future. International trade agreements can be expected to lead to price
liberalization and to more exposure of farmers to competitive market forces. Furthermore, as
trade is expanded, new quality requirements are likely to be defined for farm products, such as
stricter rules for use of fertilizers, herbicides and medicines for animals. As a result, production
risk is also likely to increase. Such developments affect the variability in income from farming.
As a consequence, there may be a need for complementary measures that stabilize and safeguard
incomes without interfering significantly with markets for agricultural products. One possibility
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to address income stabilization is providing insurance schemes. The goal of this study is to
examine whether there might be a case for farm income insurance in the EU in the future.
Materials and methods
In the research, an extended literature review was carried out first. Experiences with gross
revenue insurance schemes in the US and Net Income Stabilization Accounts (NISA) in Canada
were studied. Furthermore, a workshop with twenty selected experts from insurance, reinsurance
and financial companies from six EU member states was organized. Goal of the workshop was to
discuss the idea of different types of income insurance schemes to see whether income insurance
might be a feasible and practical concept. And, if so, for which commodities and risks, and in
what form. The workshop consisted of four parts from which the first focused on various income
measures, the second on moral hazard and adverse selection problems, the third on the role of
governments, and the fourth on insurable commodities and risks. Each part of the workshop
consisted of the completion of a questionnaire followed by a group discussion.
In discussing individual insurance schemes, it is essential to have available individual farm
data, because aggregated data from large areas would hide individual farm yield fluctuations. A
large panel data set, containing individual farm yield data from the period 1989-1995 (FADN
Information European Commission), was analyzed. The data set includes annual data from six
EU member states (Denmark, France, Germany (BRD), Greece, Italy and the Netherlands) and
six agricultural commodities (wheat, potatoes, sugar beet, beef, milk and piglets). The total data
set consists of 49 regions and about 13,000 farms. Furthermore, also price data were analyzed
(Eurostat; Amsterdam Exchange Market). Based on the data analyses, cumulative and lognormal3
distribution functions were estimated  for yields and prices respectively, to be used in a Monte
Carlo simulation model (using @Risk and Excel). Monte Carlo simulation is considered an
appropriate and very flexible method of investigating aspects that are stochastic of nature, such as
yields and prices that determine income from farming.
Insurable risks
In the insurance literature, there seems not to be a clear definition of uninsurable risks. However,
the following three factors are often identified as impediments to the successful operation of a
private insurance market: asymmetric information, systemic risks and shortage of accurate data
(Jaffee and Russell).
Asymmetric information refers to a situation in which one party has more or better
information than the other party. Asymmetric information manifests itself in two ways in insurance:
moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs when an individual purchases an insurance
policy and as a result of having purchased that policy, alters his/her behavior (production or
management practices) so as to increase the potential magnitude of a loss and/or the probability of a
loss. Tools insurers use to handle moral hazard are the use of deductibles, co-payments, no-claim
bonuses, and to check if the insured really observes his/her obligations of taking proper care to
prevent accidents and limit the damage if an accident occurs. Adverse selection occurs when
potential insurance purchasers have more or better information about their potential magnitude of
loss and/or probability of loss than does the insurer. Ways to reduce adverse selection are to assign
insurance purchasers to various risk classifications based on thorough information about their4
magnitude and probability of loss, or even to exclude high-risk people, areas etc. from insurance
(Borch; Barnett, Skees and Black).
A risk is called systemic if multiple insureds suffer losses at the same time from one peril, so
exposing the insurer to a very large potential loss (Barnett, Skees and Black). Private sector
insurance companies have problems to maintain adequate reserves and to get enough reinsurance
capacity in dealing with risks that are systemic. However, opportunities exist to enlarge the
reinsurance capacity by using capital markets (Canter, Cole and Sandor; Miranda and Glauber).
Concerning the availability of accurate data, these are necessary to base actuarially sound
premiums on, and to calculate the size of indemnity payments. If an income insurance scheme is
developed for all EU member states, it is important that data are available and reliable, and measured
uniformly within regions, member states or even the EU, so that data are (or can be made)
comparable between member states.
Basic results from data analyses
From the large panel data set containing individual yield data, for each farmer the average yield
and the coefficient of variance (CV) is calculated. The same is done for the group as a whole.
Concerning the CVs of yields for the group as a whole, these are calculated for the absolute data
(CVabs) and for the data after expressing them relatively to farm averages (CVrel). Table 1 shows
the results for a few commodities and regions.
INSERT TABLE 1
Table 1 shows that the variability of yields within farms is higher than 15-20%, which would be a
reasonable deductible, for most commodities and regions.5
Concerning the variability of potato, wheat and sugar beet prices, analyses show that the CV is
highest for potatoes (ranging from 18.0% in Luxembourg to 46.1% in Belgium) and lowest for
sugar beet (ranging from 2.8% in Italy to 17.9% in Finland). For potatoes, no price support is
available in the EU, in contrast to sugar beet.
Defining an insurance concept for European agriculture
A general set-up
Although the literature and our data analyses show that yields and prices vary considerably over
time and among regions, we argue that insuring total family income as such is not possible. In the
first place, because total family income includes off-farm income, fixed costs (rent and interest)
and variable costs (e.g. feeding costs). Insuring these factors will involve significant problems of
fraud, moral hazard and adverse selection. In the second place, because total family income is
influenced by prices. In insuring prices it is very difficult to determine whether the price
fluctuation is caused by an insured peril, because price fluctuations are usually caused by
multiple factors. Besides the problems mentioned, for all aspects it applies that accurate, reliable
and comparable data to base premiums and indemnities on might not be (sufficiently) available
throughout the EU. This is especially true for prices, since futures markets (at which prices can
be measured objectively) are not (yet) well developed in the EU. This is a further argument not to
insure total family income. For these reasons we argue that 'income' insurance should be
restricted to yield-only insurance.
We further argue that these yield-only insurance schemes should be organized per commodity
and per region. Per (homogeneous) region, because at regional level production circumstances6
are relative homogeneous, and, concerning the coverage of excess losses, this can then (largely)
be arranged at the regional level, which prevents that low risk regions pay for high-risk regions.
The size of regions can vary for different commodities and do not need to be restricted to member
states. Per commodity, because the (input, production and output) differences among
commodities (over time and among regions) are too large. Furthermore, insurance schemes per
commodity enable farmers to create their own most efficient risk management portfolio, because
they can choose which commodity they want to insure and against what level (given the degree
of specialization of the farm, the relative importance of off-farm income etc.).
A yield-only insurance scheme for a particular commodity could be set up as a multiple peril
insurance scheme that covers named perils. A named peril insurance scheme is here preferred to
an all risk scheme, because obtaining reinsurance for a named peril insurance is easier than for an
all-risk insurance, among others, because in an all-risk insurance perils yet unknown at the
moment the insurance is written cannot be excluded from insurance. The perils covered in the
yield-only insurance refer to external causes that have a large impact on the farm’s results
(catastrophe at farm level) and that are currently not yet covered (such as fire, hail and storm).
Such risks may involve one single farm (incident), but may also involve multiple farms
(catastrophe at regional level, i.e. systemic risks). Examples of such risks include floods,
droughts and epidemic diseases.
The role of governments
Participants of the workshop argued that governments (national governments as well as the
European Commission) should play a (limited) financial role in any insurance scheme, because
they create rules that influence the losses, and because it is then easier to get reinsurance capacity
at the traditional reinsurance markets. For these reasons, and because the yield-only insurance7
covers risks that have systemic characteristics, for which at this moment not enough reinsurance
capacity exists, we argue that the role of governments could be one of ‘lender of last resort’,
meaning that they do not have to step in for every Euro of loss, but only if losses are very large.
Commercial versus mutual schemes
The type of yield-only insurance scheme described above can be introduced as a commercial
insurance scheme, but also as a so-called mutual insurance fund. We define a mutual insurance
fund as a fund that is operated by farmers themselves. Farmers decide what losses are indemnified
and, as a result, how much premium is to be paid. A fund does not need to build reserves for the
‘big hit’; farmers pay a small premium to cover administrative costs and reinsurance (i.e. the
‘infrastructure’), the fund then gives a guarantee to indemnify losses, and, if necessary, farmers
have to pay a surcharge to finance a loss. With mutual insurance funds, the role of insurance
companies is restricted to that of administrator and reinsurer. An advantage of using pure mutual
insurance funds is the possibility of surcharging. Surcharges confront farmers directly with large
losses in a certain year, which is a direct incentive to avoid or reduce the risk next year, and/or to
reduce the amount of losses the next time the peril takes place. Surcharges, furthermore, reduce
the importance of the availability of accurate data. Another advantage of a mutual insurance fund
is the increased potential for social control, especially if a fund is set up at a regional level. Also,
in a mutual fund, differentiation of premiums and indemnities for high-risk farmers has a broader
basis because it is not the insurance company but colleague farmers who impose these measures.
In addition, because premiums are (mainly) paid ‘a-posteriori’ in stead of ‘a-priori’ capital can be
used on the farm. Using commercial insurance schemes, at the other hand, has advantages too.
First, commercial insurers have experience in writing insurance policies. Second, money for
losses is gathered ‘a-priori’, which prevents that farmers confronted with losses in a certain year8
do not encounter large surcharges in the same year. In practice, a mixture of these two
approaches gets increasingly popular, i.e. combining the advantages of mutuals and those of a
commercial insurance scheme.
Future perspectives: gross revenue insurance schemes?
A condition for a gross revenue insurance scheme to work properly is the existence of a well
functioning futures and options market. In Europe, the use of these markets is not (yet)
widespread. However, the attention being given to agricultural futures markets in Europe is
increasing, among others, due to declining agricultural subsidization (MacSharry and GATT) and
the specialization of farms. The introduction of one European currency (Euro) in 2002 will
further stimulate this development. If the use of futures and options markets is more widespread
in the future, prices can be measured in an inexpensive way (low transaction costs) and
independently of the management marketing decisions of a particular farmer. Only in such case,
the price risk can be included in an insurance scheme, for example a gross revenue (price times
yield) insurance. If such schemes are introduced, special attention should be given to livestock
commodities, because of the existence of price cycles (e.g. for pigs), and to specialty products,
because small changes in production can have large influences on prices.
Simulation results
To further support the above mentioned ideas of income insurance, a Monte Carlo simulation
model is developed. With the model, the effect of yield-only and gross revenue insurance
schemes on the stability of the individual farmer’s income is illustrated. Implications for9
insurance funds are studied as well. In this paper, results for yield-only insurance schemes are
presented.
Implications for individual farmers: simulation results
The effect of a yield-only insurance on the stability of the farmer’s income is illustrated by
calculating the CV of the net return to labor and management (NR) and the frequency of net
returns being lower than 50% of the mean (in table 2 indicated by ‘<50%’) in a situation with and
without insurance. Assuming a guarantee level of 80% and an election price of 0.8 times the
market price, table 2 shows the implications of yield-only insurance schemes. Loss costs are the
basis for insurance premiums and are calculated by multiplying the probability of the insurance
fund incurring a loss by the average yield to be guaranteed. The loss costs are calculated using
the relative data underlying the CVrel shown in table 1.
INSERT TABLE 2
Table 2 shows that the yield-only insurance reduces the CV of the net return to labor and
management by about 15%. Furthermore, the chances of outcomes lower than 50% of the
average net return are reduced to zero in all cases.
The results in table 2 are calculated using the historical seven-year data as a starting point. In a
seven-year data set, the occurrence of catastrophes is likely to be underrepresented. To simulate
the effect of yield-only insurance schemes in the case of catastrophic events on the farm, a
Poisson distribution is introduced in the simulation model. The Poisson distribution is typically
used to represent situations in which a number of individual events occur in a given unit of time.
Figure 1 shows the relative net return to labor and management (with and without insurance) for
a potato farmer in the Netherlands, assuming that on average a farmer is confronted with a
catastrophic event every two-year period, and that, if in a specific year 1, 2 or more than 210
catastrophic events occur on the farm, the yield decreases by 70%, 85% and 90% respectively.
This is really a worst-case situation.
INSERT FIGURE 1
The expected value of the net return to labor and management is kept the same for the curve with
and without insurance. Farmers indifferent to risks will be indifferent to the two options, because
they base their choice on the expected value. Risk-averse farmers prefer the situation with
insurance, with the preference positively correlated with the degree of risk-aversion (Hardaker,
Huirne and Anderson).
Implications for insurance funds: simulation results
Premiums based on the loss costs are actuarially sound (assuming zero administrative costs and
profit), meaning that in the long run the indemnities paid are equal to the premiums received.
However, the ratio between indemnities paid and premiums received can vary considerably over
time, among others due to the type of risks insured. Assuming that the occurrence of catastrophic
events (that were introduced in the model in the previous section) do not occur independently but
correlated (i.e. risks are systemic), figure 2 shows, as an example, the cumulative distribution
function of premiums (P) minus indemnity payments (I) for a fund for wheat in Pays de la Loire
(France). The correlation of yields between farms is assumed to be 0.8. The curve with r=0
reflects the situation with independent risks.
INSERT FIGURE 2
As figure 2 shows with the long tail to the left, the probability of a shortage of money (i.e. P-I) is
larger if risks are systemic. At the other hand, there are also more situations in which the receipts
are much larger than the expenditures.11
Conclusions and suggestions for further research
In this paper it is argued that ‘income’ insurance in European agriculture should be restricted to
yield-only insurance schemes that are organized per commodity and per region and in which
governments play the role of ‘lender of last resort’. If such schemes are introduced as mutual
insurance funds, problems of moral hazard, adverse selection and shortage of data can be
overcome because of the increased role of social control, the familiarity with production
circumstances among colleague farmers , and the possibility of surcharges respectively.
Because this study was limited in time and the first in this field in a European context, further
research could be carried out, among others to investigate the interest of farmers in yield-only
insurance schemes that cover systemic risks such as floods, droughts and epidemic diseases, and
to the interest of insurance companies to set up (mutual insurance funds for) such schemes. In
addition, research in the field of linkages between good farming practices, (a basis level of)
insurance that covers catastrophic events, and the provision of mortgages should be conducted.
Furthermore, research should be carried out to the definition of homogeneous areas in which
production results are correlated and in which prospects for area-based insurance schemes may
exist. More generally, research should be carried out to opportunities to replace publicly funded
risk management programs with more market-based solutions. This includes the development of
futures and options markets to cover price risks, the insurance of systemic risks for which
currently ad hoc disaster programs are put in place for, and more market based agreements with
governments if they provide financial back-up.12
References
Barnett, B.J.,  J.R. Skees, and J.R. Black. New Risk/New Alternatives: Farming with a Lower
Safety Net. Forthcoming book, 1998.
Borch, K.H. Economics of insurance. Advanced textbooks in economics, Vol. 29. Amsterdam,
The Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1990.
Canter, M.S., J.B. Cole, and R.L. Sandor. “Insurance Derivatives: A New Asset Class for the
Capital Markets and a New Hedging Tool for the Insurance Industry.” J. Derivatives (Winter
1996):89-104.
Hardaker, J.B., R.B.M. Huirne, and J.R. Anderson. Coping with Risk in Agriculture. Wallingford,
UK: CAB International, 1997.
Jaffee, D.W., and T. Russell. “Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks.”
J. Risk and Insurance 64(1997):205-30.
Miranda, M.J., and J.W. Glauber. “Systemic Risk, Reinsurance, and the Failure of Crop
Insurance Markets.” Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 79(February 1997):206-15.13
Table 1 Results from individual farm yield data analysis













The Netherlands 43 423 22.4 13.1 12.2
Baden-Würtemberg (Germany) 44 234 41.3 31.6 29.5
Denmark 24 289 37.5 29.1 26.6
Wheat
Makedonia-Thraki (Greece) 284 31 33.4 28.3 25.6
Pays de la Loire (France) 104 59 24.9 19.4 17.8
Piemonte (Italy) 107 48 26.4 22.1 20.0
Sugar beet
Marche (Italy) 255 420 26.9 23.2 21.1
Makedonia-Thraki (Greece) 65 710 25.0 19.8 18.6
Picardie (France) 112 644 16.6 13.3 12.4
1) Coefficient of variance (CV) = (sd/mean)*100%
Table 2 Implications of yield-only insurance for individual farmers (500 @Risk iterations)














The Netherlands 13.5 0 12.6 0 0.5
Baden-Würtemberg (Germany) 31.7 32 27.1 0 4.3
Denmark 29.3 48 24.4 0 4.3
Wheat
Makedonia-Thraki (Greece) 28.4 42 23.4 0 3.9
Pays de la Loire (France) 19.5 13 16.5 0 1.7
Piemonte (Italy) 22.2 20 18.6 0 2.4
Sugar beet
Marche (Italy) 23.3 12 20.7 0 1.9
Makedonia-Thraki (Greece) 19.8 3 17.5 0 1.6
Picardie (France) 13.3 1 12.0 0 0.5
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Figure 1 Net return (with and without insurance)
for a potato farmer in the Netherlands
Figure 2 Premiums received (P) minus indemnities paid (I)
for a fund for wheat (pool of 100 farms) in Pays de la Loire